

## Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY LISBON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5793

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 LISBON 562

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4

TAGS: PFOR, PO, AO

SUBJ: ANGOLA AND THE PORTUGUESE

1. IN EVERY CONVERSATION WITH PORTUGUESE LEADERS, ANGOLA CAME UP AND THEY ALL VOLUNTEERED THEIR VIEWS VOCIFEROUSLY. ANTUNES PARTICULARLY ASKED ME TO PASS ON HIS VIEWS DIRECTLY TO YOU, BUT TO STRESS THAT THERE IS NO GOVERNMENT POSITION ON CHANGING THEIR POLICY AND CONSIDERABLE DEBATE AND DISAGREEMENT ON MPLA RECOGNITION, WHICH HE FAVORS AND AZEVEDO AND SOME SOCIALISTS OPPOSE. I ENCOURAGED THOSE OPPOSING RECOGNITION; ARGUED WITH THE PRO-RECOGNITION GROUP THAT TIME WAS NECESSARY TO TRY AND FIND SOME MEANS TO GET THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS OUT; AND ASSURED BOTH COSTA GOMES AND AZEVEDO, IN ANSWER TO THEIR QUERIES, THAT WE HAD NOT CHANGED OUR POLICY AND WOULD CERTAINLY TALK TO THEM PRIOR TO ANY CHANGE. THE LATTER TWO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS ASSURANCE. (NOT KNOWING THE NUANCES OF THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE FOLLOWING IS A FAIRLY FULL REPORT OF WHAT I WAS TOLD.)

2. ANGOLA DISCUSSION WITH ANTUNES LASTED THREE HOURS AND WAS PRINCIPAL TOPIC WE COVERED. TALK WAS SERIOUS, SOBER, AND OBJECTIVE THROUGHOUT. ANTUNES THINKS MPLA WILL WIN. HE SAYS WE -- PORTUGAL AND THE US -- HAVE COMMON INTEREST IN KEEPING SOVIETS OUT OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. PORTUGAL COULD HELP GET THEM OUT BY RECOGNIZING MPLA AND WORKING WITH ELEMENTS IN

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MPLA WHO DO NOT WANT TO BE DEPENDENT ON SOVIETS. HE SAID

THAT JUST BEFORE THE OAU MEETING AN MPLA GROUP CAME TO SEE HIM TO SAY THEY DID NOT LIKE SOVIET DOMINATION. HE FEELS NETO SYMPATHIZES WITH THIS GROUP AND PRIME MINISTER NASCIMENTO IS STRONGLY BEHIND THEM. (LATTER IS GOOD FRIEND OF ANTUNES AND ANTUNES BELIEVES HE IS BETTER AND STRONGER THAN NETO.) HE THINKS THIS GROUP WOULD ALSO BE FRIENDLY TO THE U.S. I ASKED WHAT ASSURANCE THEY COULD GET OF SUCCESS BY THIS GROUP, SINCE ONCE RECOGNITION TAKES PLACE THEY HAVE LOST THE ESSENTIAL BARGAINING CARD. HE THOUGHT IT IMPORTANT TO DISCUSS THIS IN ADVANCE. I ASKED HOW THEY COULD CHANGE WHILE SOVIETS AND CUBANS THERE. HE SAID MAJORITY OF MPLA WANT TO ELIMINATE FOREIGN DOMINATION, ALTHOUGH THEY WILL REMAIN MARXIST. I SAID THAT DIDN'T BOTHER US BUT SOVIET AND CUBAN PRESENCE DID.

3. ANTUNES SAID ARGUMENTS AGAINST RECOGNITION ARE, FIRST, THE LEGAL ONE THAT UNDER THE ALVOR AGREEMENT NO ONE PARTY SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED; SECOND, THE POLITICAL DANGER OF RECOGNITION IN THE FACE OF 300,000 ANGOLAN REFUGEES WHO ARE ANTI-MPLA; AND, THIRD, THE CONSERVATIVE ARGUMENT THAT MPLA ARE SOVIET PUPPETS. IN SPITE OF THESE ARGUMENTS ANTUNES FAVORS RECOGNITION BUT OTHERS ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED. HE THINKS ROBERTO IS FINISHED AND WARNS THAT MOBUTU IS A REALIST WHO MAY SURPRISE US ALL AND RECOGNIZE MPLA. SAVIMBI IS ALSO DISCREDITED WITH THE MPLA FOR HIS "TREASONOUS" DEAL WITH THE PORTUGUESE MILITARY BEFORE APRIL 1974, BUT THE MPLA MIGHT TAKE IN OTHER UNITA LEADERS.

4. ANTUNES SAID HE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS AND THOUGHT IT A GOOD IDEA TO CONTINUE AND EXCHANGE INFORMATION. HE UNDERSTANDS, HE SAYS, OUR PROBLEM IS WITH THE ACTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND CUBA AND THEREFORE WE MIGHT REACH DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS, BUT HE SAYS HIS OBJECTIVE IS LIKE OURS, TO GET THEM OUT.

5. PRESIDENT COSTA GOMES WAS UNUSUALLY SPIRITED IN OUR DISCUSSION. I HAD NOT INTENDED TO GET INTO ANGOLA EXCEPT TO STATE OUR VIEW ON RECOGNITION. BUT HE JUMPED UP, GOT A SHELL ROAD MAP OF ANGOLA, AND WAS CHIEF OF STAFF ONCE AGAIN FIGHTING THE BATTLE. HE SAYS MPLA IS WINNING,

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THEIR CADRES ARE RUNNING THINGS EVEN IN THE AREA NOMINALLY CONTROLLED BY UNITA. HE THEN RECALLED HIS SACLANC DAYS AND TOLD ME WHAT A QUOTE DISASTER FOR THE WEST IT WOULD BE FOR THE SOVIETS TO GET A FOOTHOLD ON THE STRATEGIC COAST OF AFRICA FACING BRAZIL ATHWART OUR OIL LIFELINES UNQUOTE. HE SAID WE SHOULD HAVE DONE MORE TO STOP THE SOVIETS. THE FNLA IS HOPELESS. UNITA IS BETTER BUT THE MPLA HAS THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPARATUS. HE COMMENTED THAT

SOUTH AFRICA WAS VERY WEAK AND THIS MIGHT BE THE REAL SOVIET OBJECTIVE. HE SAID THEIR AIR FORCE WAS ALL RIGHT BUT THE ARMY AND NAM WERE BAD. COSTA GOMES DOES NOT FAVOR RECOGNITION BUT WANTED TO KNOW IF NEWS REPORTS WERE TRUE THAT WE WERE SHIFTING. I GAVE HIM ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD TELL PORTUGAL IF WE EVER DECIDED TO SHIFT AND MEANTIME HOLD FAST. HERB OKUN TELLS ME THIS WAS A MOST UNCHARACTERISTICALLY ANIMATED PERFORMANCE.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5794

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 LISBON 562

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

6. PRIME MINISTER AZEVEDO TREATED ME TO MY SECOND BIZARRE CONVERSATION WITH HIM. (IN THE FIRST, IN WASHINGTON WHEN HE CAME AS NAVAL CHIEF OF STAFF, HE TOLD ME THE U.S. SHOULD HELP TRANSFER THE EXPERIENCE OF EASTERN EUROPE TO PORTUGAL. HE HAS IMPROVED LOTS SINCE THEN.) HE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO GO TO A REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING WHERE THEY WOULD ONCE AGAIN DEBATE MPLA RECOGNITION TO WHICH HE WAS THOROUGHLY OPPOSED. (TODAY'S PRESS REPORTED NO DECISIONS ON ANGOLA IN JANUARY 26 REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MEETING.) HE SAID HE WOULD HOLD THE LINE, BUT IF WE SHOULD EVER THINK OF CHANGING OUR POSITION, QUOTE PLEASE TELL ME UNQUOTE. HE THEN WENT ON TO SAY THAT HE HEARD RUMORS THAT NETO HAD BEEN IMPRISONED LAST WEEK ON A SHIP IN LUANDA HARBOR. HE SAID HE KNOWS NETO AND NASCIMENTO, BUT THE HEAD OF MPLA MILITARY FORCES IS REALLY IN CONTROL AND HE IS PRO-SOVIET. AZEVEDO SAYS THAT HE HAS A MAN IN LUANDA WHO IS IN TOUCH WITH ALL THE LEADERS. HE THEN SAID HE HAD HEARD THAT NIGERIAN FORCES WERE ABOUT

TO BE INTRODUCED INTO ANGOLA WITH THE PURPOSE OF HELPING THE MPLA FORCES, FIRST TO QUOTE LIBERATE UNQUOTE SOUTHERN ANGOLA AND LATER TO TAKE NAMIBIA. HE PRONOUNCED THIS AS VERY BAD FOR SOUTH AFRICA. I SAID THAT I HAD NOT HEARD SUCH A REPORT BUT WOULD PASS IT ON TO WASHINGTON. HE REPEATED AGAIN THAT IT WAS HARD FOR HIM NOT TO RECOGNIZE THE MPLA.

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7. CAMPINOS AND ZENHA, LEADING SOCIALISTS, ARE BOTH VERY ANTI-MPLA AND AGAINST RECOGNITION. CAMPINOS WAS BORN AND GREW UP IN ANGOLA AND KNOWS MOST OF THE ANGOLAN LEADERS. HE SAID THERE ARE DIFFERENT CURRENTS, BUT REAL CONTROL IN THE MPLA IS IN THE MILITARY LEADERSHIP, WHERE THE PCP HAD A STRONG INFLUENCE AND WHERE THEY ARE STRONGLY, PRO-SOVIET. ZENHA WAS THE MOST OUTSPOKEN AGAINST NETO WITH WHOM HE USED TO COMMUNICATE BY TAPPING ON THEIR COMMON JAIL WALL. HE SAID NETO IS A HARDLINER LIKE CUNHAL. ZENHA SAYS HE ALWAYS KNEW SOVIETS WOULD COME IN IN A BIG WAY. THE PLACE IS TOO ATTRACTIVE. A RICH COUNTRY WITH FEW PEOPLE. HE FEELS THAT THEY WILL NEVER GET OUT.

8. TODAY I SEE CRESPO WHO HAS LED THE PRO-RECOGNITION FORCES WITH ANTUNES.

9. ONE LAST AMUSING SIDELIGHT. WHEN YOU TOLD STORY IN BRUSSELS OF BRESHNEV COMMENT THAT HE HAD NEVER LAID EYES ON CUNHAL, ANTUNES REPEATED THE STORY TO COSTA GOMES. COSTA GOMES SAID THAT WHEN HE WAS IN MOSCOW BRESHNEV HAD TOLD HIM THE SAME THING. ON HIS RETURN COSTA GOMES REPEATED IT TO CUNHAL WHO SAID, QUOTE BRESHNEV'S A LIAR. I'VE TALKED TO HIM MANY TIMES. UNQUOTE.  
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